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Abstract—Quantum Key Agreement (QKA) signifies that two
or more participants together generate a key and QKA has to
satisfy the following conditions: 1 Every participant can change
the key and the key is not decided by any participant individually.
2 Only participants can know the key; nonparticipants cannot get
the key through illegal means. Because of the condition 1 of par-
ticipating together, it makes transport inefficient in the current
mainstream protocols. They use unicast to exchange messages
one by one, so it will considerably limit transmission efficiency
and increase cost time spent. This study proposes a protocol
based on Multiparty Quantum Secret Direct Communication
(MQSDC) with multicast. In addition to satisfying the above
conditions, it uses multicast to not only achieve the effect and
purpose of QKA, but also to defend against internal and external
attacks at the same time. In regard to resource consumption,
this study involves linear growth and is more efficient than other
mainstream protocols which employ exponential growth.
Index Terms—Multiparty Quantum Key Agreement, Quantum
Secret Direct Communication, Quantum Key Agreement.
I. INTRODUCTION
QUANTUM cryptography has been paid attention sinceBennett and Brassard [1] proposed the first quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocol in 1984. Its security had been
proved to be unconditionally secure [2] [3]. It is foundation
of Quantum cryptography, detect eavesdropper and distribute
classical key. The key point is that the security of quantum
cryptography is based on quantum theory (such as uncertainty
principle and quantum no-cloning theorem [4]), rather than
the assumption of computation complexity which is the math-
ematical problems that are hard to be solved (such as discrete
logarithm and prime factor decomposition).
Moreover, the quantum theory can be a spear to break the
protection of classical cryptography by the parallel compu-
tation. The quantum computer can evaluate all the solutions
at the same time, and find the exactly one by the superposi-
tion principle in quantum theory. The famous algorithms are
Deutsch-Jozsa [5] (an algorithm which can distinguish the kind
of input function), Shor [6] (an algorithm which can speed up
the prime factor decomposition) and Grover [7] (an algorithm
which can search the data from unsorted database by O(
√
N)).
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As a result, the classical cryptography will be challenged when
the quantum computer is implemented. Therefore, the quantum
cryptography is the best way to avoid the destroy from the
quantum computer.
The quantum cryptography has been developed over 30
years. It contains four topic which are quantum key distri-
bution (QKD), quantum secret direct communication (QSDC),
quantum secret sharing (QSS), and quantum oblivious transfer
(QOT). The concept of them evolved from classical cryptogra-
phy. However, the research of quantum key agreement (QKA)
is slow development. The key agreement (KA) is common in
classical cryptography, but the QKA was designed by Zhou
et al. [8] later in 2004. The QKA is a subset from QKD, but
the condition of key generator is stricter than QKD. QKA has
two important conditions, 1 Every participant can change the
key and the key is not decided by any participant individually,
2 Only participants can know the key; nonparticipants cannot
get the key through illegal means. However, the condition 1
causes that two-party QKA is hard to extend to multi-party
until 2012. Shi and Zhong [9] proposed the first multi-party
QKA (MQKA) by using Bell states. After that, Liu et al.
[10] pointed out the drawback of Shi and Zhong’s protocol,
and proposed another MQKA protocol by using single states.
To 2015, more two-party QKA was proposed, such as [11]–
[14]. And more multi-party QKA was also discussed, such as
[15]–[17]. Nowadays, the QKA is getting more attention, the
researchers is striving to develop and complete.
However, the researchers have a dispute about the condition
1, which said every participant can change the key. It means
that every participant should join the key generation. Some
researchers define the “join” as “measurement”, such as [13],
[18]. The “measurement” means that the participants can not
change the key by their idea, the key will be determine by
random, just like BB84 [1]. But, some researchers consider
the “join” to be “operation”, such as [9], [10], [15]–[17]. The
“operation” means that the participants can inject their idea of
key into the final key. In other word, the second definition is
harder to implement than the first. So far, the MQKA protocols
[9], [10], [15]–[17] are belonged to the “operation” definition.
Even so, their protocols are ineffective because condition 1
causes the protocol design to be unicast. All of participants
should exchange their operation with the others for final key
generator. It is worth mentioning the multicast will better than
the unicast. And our protocol is a multicast design which is
inspired by multi-party QSDC proposed by Jin et al. [19] in
2006. It can use multicast to transmit their operations to all
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2participants at once. In this way, our protocol is more efficient
than [9], [10], [15]–[17].
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, the notation
definition is defined. Section III is the proposed protocol of this
research, first, for easy understand, the two-party QKA (sec.
III-A) will be introduced. And then, multi-party QKA (sec.
III-B) are proposed. After that, the key generator (sec. III-C) is
presented which is the formula for the key without codebook.
Section IV concerns the security analysis of the proposed
protocol which are external and internal attack. Section V is
the consumption comparison. Finally, section VI concludes
this research.
II. NOTATION DEFINITION
The information carried at quantum computer called quan-
tum bit, abbreviated as qubit. The qubit states are defined as
a basis of a 2D plane with the ket notation |·〉. For example,
qubit states |0〉 = [1 0]T and |1〉 = [0 1]T , it is a standard basis
on 2D plane. As a result, the user can define any qubit states
according to their requirement. There are two common bases,
Z and X basis, {|0〉 , |1〉} and {|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)}.
The quantum theory uses tensor product ⊗ to bind two
or more qubits together. And the product can extend the
dimension of the qubits, for instance,
|0〉 ⊗ |0〉 = |00〉 = [1 · [1 0] 0 · [1 0]]T = [1 0 0 0]T .
A. Quantum gate
The quantum computer should use the quantum gate to
complete the computation. And all of these quantum gates
are the unitary operation which is UU∗ = I , where U∗ is
the adjoint of U . There are five common single qubit gates
(operations) as follows:
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
,
Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
and H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
.
Moreover, quantum computer can use a special gate to
operate two or more qubits, called control-not gate (CNOT, as
FIg. 1). It is composed of control and target bit. The control
bit is the input bit which can influence the target bit. And
the target bit will change its state according to the signal of
control bit. For example, the Fig. 1(a) doesn’t influence the
target bit when the input bit is |0〉. On the other hand, the
target bit will be perform Not gate, if the control bit is |1〉,
such as Fig. 1(b). This paper use CNOTA,B to present the
control-not gate, where subscript A and B are control and
target bit, respectively.
B. Superposition
Different from the classical bit, the qubit contains state |0〉
and |1〉 at the same time, such as follow:
|ψ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉 (1)
where the |α|2 and |β|2 are the probability to get the state |0〉
and |1〉, respectively.
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Fig. 1. The control-not gate. (a) the control bit doesn’t influence the target
bit. (b) the target bit performs a not operation by influencing of control bit.
C. Entanglement
The entanglement is another powerful property of quantum
machine. It happens at two or more qubits. In fact, the
entangled state is the basis at high dimension. The common
two qubits entangled states are called Bell state. It contains
four entangles states as follows:
|Φ±〉AB =
1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉)AB ,
|Ψ±〉AB =
1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉)AB ,
(2)
where the A and B are the number of the first and second
qubit, respectively.
And the three or more entangled states are called GHZ state.
For instance, three entangled GHZ states contain 8 states as
follows:
|Ψ000,100〉ABC =
1√
2
(|000〉 ± |111〉)ABC ,
|Ψ001,101〉ABC =
1√
2
(|001〉 ± |110〉)ABC ,
|Ψ010,110〉ABC =
1√
2
(|010〉 ± |101〉)ABC ,
|Ψ011,111〉ABC =
1√
2
(|011〉 ± |100〉)ABC ,
(3)
where the subscript of |Ψ〉 is GHZ state number, for example,
|Ψ000〉 present 1√2 (|000〉+ |111〉)ABC .
The entangled states should be distinguish by Bell and GHZ
measurement. As Fig. 2, Fig. 2(a) is the Bell measurement.
The Bell states should be convert to four states as follows:
|Φ+〉 ⇒ |00〉 , |Φ−〉 ⇒ |10〉 , |Ψ+〉 ⇒ |01〉 , |Ψ−〉 ⇒ |11〉 .
The GHZ measurement is the same as the Bell measurement
by using more control-not gate as Fig. 2(b), and converts the
8 states to other 8 states as follows:
|Ψ000〉 ⇒ |000〉 , |Ψ001〉 ⇒ |001〉 , |Ψ010〉 ⇒ |010〉 , |Ψ011〉 ⇒ |011〉 ,
|Ψ100〉 ⇒ |100〉 , |Ψ101〉 ⇒ |101〉 , |Ψ110〉 ⇒ |110〉 , |Ψ111〉 ⇒ |111〉 .
More entangled qubits measurement is called as
GHZ measurement too. And it can be wrote as
CNOTA,NCNOTA,N−1...CNOTA,BH .
3H H
(a)
H H
(b)
Fig. 2. Entangled measurement. (a) Bell measurement. (b) GHZ measurement.
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Fig. 3. Step 1 of basic idea.
III. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section will introduce our idea sequentially. The first
is the easiest case, two-party QKA, and it can also be known
as bidirectional QSDC which two participants exchange their
secret message. The second is generalizing our protocol to any
number of participant. Finally, this protocol proposes a key
generator method to quickly exact the key without codebook.
A. The proposed two-party QKA protocol (basic idea)
Our protocol is the improvement from multi-party QSDC
protocol by Jin et al. [19]. In two-party, there are two par-
ticipants, Alice and Bob, who want to exchange their idea
of the secret key. In other word, Alice and Bob has the
secret key KeyA and KeyB respectively. And the final key is
KeyA ⊕ KeyB . That is, it belongs to condition 1 that each
participant can change the key by their idea. The protocol
consists of 5 steps as follows:
1) Step 1 (resource distribution): Alice prepares the Bell
states sequence, which the each Bell state is |Φ+〉. And she
split it into two sequences called SA and SB respectively.
After that, Alice inserts the single qubits with Z and X-basis
into SB for the channel checking, which each qubit is one of
two bases. And then, she send SB to Bob. The Fig. 3 show
the whole system state from left to right.
2) Step 2 (channel checking): When Bob received the SB ,
Alice tells the position and state of the qubits for the channel
checking to him. Then Bob measures these qubits with the
bases that is same as Alice prepared. They check these single
qubit states. If the error rate is higher than the threshold, this
communication should be aborted. Otherwise, they go to the
next step. The scenario of this step is showed at left and middle
of Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Step 2 and 3 of basic idea.
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Fig. 5. Step 4 of basic idea.
3) Step 3 (self key encryption): In this step, two roles
should be defined first, called leader (L) and follower (F).
Leader measures the entangled state and publishes the mea-
surement results to the all followers. In two-party case, Alice
is a leader at the number of entangled pair is odd, otherwise,
she is a follower. The definition is same as Bob, but even.
The leader can performs one of four operations {I , X , Y , Z}
at the qubit hold by him. And the follower can perform one
of two operations {I , X} at the qubit hold by him. Leader
and follower performs their operations called M according to
their self key “0” and “1”, respectively. The operations I , X ,
Y and Z present message “0”, “0”, “1” and “1” for leader in
two-party case, respectively. And operations I and X presents
“0” and “1” for follower in two-party case, respectively. It is
showed at right of Fig. 4
4) Step 4 (channel checking): Alice and Bob inserts the
qubits into the sequence which will be transferred to another
with Z and X-basis, such as Fig. 5. And then, Alice sends the
sequence to Bob which all the number of qubits are even. And
Bob does the same thing with odd. After these two sequences
are received by them, they tell the basis and position of these
qubits, and perform the measurement on them. If the channel
is safe, they go to the next step. Otherwise, they abort this
communication.
5) Step 5 (secret key generating): Leader performs Bell
measurement on the entangled qubits hold by him, and pub-
lishes the measurement results to follower, showed in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. Step 5 of basic idea.
Finally, they can exact the operations of another participant
did, and decided the final key. For the simple example as Table
I at a entangled pair, if the Bell measurement result published
by leader is |Ψ+〉, and the operation of follower is X , the final
key is “1”. According to the measurement result, leader can
also know the key is “1” by his operation I . The people who
is not a participant can not know the final key, because there
are two keys “0” and “1” according to the |Ψ+〉 of Table I.
TABLE I
KEY GENERATING OF TWO-PARTY QKA
XXXXXXXF’s op.
L’s op.
LI LX LY LZ
FI |Φ+〉 = 0 |Ψ+〉 = 0 |Ψ−〉 = 1 |Φ−〉 = 1
FX |Ψ+〉 = 1 |Φ+〉 = 1 |Φ−〉 = 0 |Ψ−〉 = 0
B. The proposed multi-party QKA protocol
According to the basic idea of two-party QKA protocol,
it can be generalized to multi-party case by defining the
relationship between leader and followers. The multi-party
case contains 5 steps as follows:
1) Step 1 (resource distribution): The participants Alice,
Bob, Charlie, ..., Nick will agree a session key. First, Alice
prepares the GHZ sequence with the GHZ state as
1√
2
(|000...0〉+ |111...1〉)ABC...N ,
where A, B, C, ..., N are presented participant Alice, Bob,
Charlie, ..., Nick, respectively. And she splits it to N sequences
called SA, SB , SC , ..., SN , respectively. Then she inserts
the qubits for channel checking with random one of four
states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} for each qubit to SB , SC , ..., SN ,
respectively. After that, she sends SB , SC , ..., SN to the Bob,
Charlie, ..., Nick, respectively.
2) Step 2 (channel checking): Alice publishes the basis
and position which she prepared for channel checking when
other participants received their sequences. All participants
publish their measurement result to Alice. They abort this
communication, if the error rate is higher than threshold.
Otherwise, they go to next step.
3) Step 3 (self key encryption): Every participants should
be a leader alternately. And others should be followers. The
rule of operations of leader is (4). And the follower can only
perform one of two operations I and X to present his self
“0” and “1”, respectively. The reason of different number of
operations from leader and follower is that a participant should
perform Y and Z to extend the entangled states to maximal.
For an example of the leader decision, the string of leader is
“ABC...NABC...NABC...”. Alice is a leader at S1A, S
1
B , S
1
C ,
..., S1N , and Bob is a leader at S
2
A, S
2
B , S
2
C , ..., S
2
N and so on,
where subscript is presented as number of GHZ states. When
all participants have already been leader, it turn to Alice, Bob,
Charlie and so on.
I and Y present “0”,
X and Z present “1”, if N is odd
I and X present “0”,
Y and Z present “1”, if N is even
(4)
4) Step 4 (channel checking): After the self key encryption,
all participants insert the qubits for channel checking as Alice
did at step 1. They send their qubit to the leader under the
number of sequence. When all leaders received the qubits
from followers, they publish the qubit state and position for
the channel checking, and check the error rate. They abort
this communication, if the error rate is higher than threshold.
Otherwise, they go to next step.
5) Step 5 (secret key generating): All leaders perform GHZ
measurements and publish the measurement outcomes. After
the measurement results, all of participants can distinguish the
operations of each follower did, and exact the same key similar
as Table I to complete the agreement. The rule of key exaction
is discussed at next section.
C. Key generating
The final key is determined by XOR result of self key
of all participants. In this section, two viewpoints will be
discussed, which are leader and follower. Under these two
viewpoints, this section gives a rule to exact the operation of
all participants.
1) viewpoint of leader: Leader performs GHZ measurement
and publishes the measurement outcomes to all followers.
He performs not gate on the qubits except a qubit that he
performed one of four operations, if his operation is I and Y .
Then the result |0〉 represents that the participant performed
I ,and |1〉 is X .
For example, there are three participants Alice, Bob and
Charlie. Alice is a leader in this round. If she publishes the
measurement outcome is |Ψ110〉ABC = |110〉ABC , and her
operation is Y , then she performs not gate on the result of
qubit B and C, and she gets |01〉BC . The result |0〉 and |1〉
represent operation I and X , respectively. According to (4),
she can build final key as 0A ⊗ 0B ⊗ 1C = 1.
2) viewpoint of follower: When the followers received the
measurement outcomes, they observe the qubit result of leader.
The leader must perform Y and Z to change his result to be
|1〉. Furthermore, followers perform not gate on their results, if
their qubit state of measurement result is different from their
5operation which is self key. After that, they can distinguish
leader’s operation which the result is |0〉 when the operation
is Y . Otherwise, his operation is Z.
Following the example above, the followers are Bob and
Charlie, and the GHZ measurement result is |110〉ABC . In this
case, Bob performed I gate, but the result of qubit B is |1〉.
Then he performs X gate to these three qubits to change the
entangled state to |001〉ABC . And he knows that the operation
of leader (Alice) is Y , and another follower’s (Charlie) is X .
Furthermore, the result of key agreement is 0A⊗0B⊗1C = 1
according to (4).
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section discuss two kind of attacks which are external
and internal attack. External attack is the discussion which any
non-participants want to get the results of key agreement. And
internal attack is that the possibility exist or not that there are
any participants can determine the results of key agreement
without all participants.
A. External attack
There is an eavesdropper called Eve who wants to exact
the secret key. She can try to use three common method to
test the quantum system and exact the secret key, which are
“intercept-and-resend”, “control-not” and “fake-participant”.
According to the idea before, Eve can get each bit of final
key if she gets one operation of any participants. Therefore,
this section only discusses a interaction between Eve and one
of any participants.
1) Intercept-and-resend attack: Eve intercepts all qubits
from followers to leader. And she measures them to try to get
the operations performed by followers. However, she doesn’t
know what the qubits state and position is, prepared at step
III-B4. She may change the qubit states prepared by followers,
and she will be discovered according to the 14 probability with
single qubit [1].
2) Control-not attack: Eve can try multiple control-not
gates on transmission qubits proposed by Gao et al. [20].
She can know that odd or even operation X performed from
followers, if she can know the qubit position of self key
transmission. For example, three-party QKA protocol, Alice
is a leader in this round with inital state |Ψ000〉ABC , and Bob
and Charlie performs X and I on qubit B and C, it changes the
entangled state into |Ψ010〉ABC respectively. Then they resend
qubit B and C to Alice. During the transmission period, Eve
steals them and performs CNOTB,E and CNOTC,E with her
single qubit |0〉E , if she can filter out the qubits for channel
checking. She can get |1〉 which means qubit B ⊕ C.
However, she can not know which qubits are for channel
checking, and she may influence these qubits and then be
detected. Following above, for example, Charlie resends qubit
with |+〉C′ for channel checking at the same position, and Bob
resends entangled qubit to Alice. Eve steals and entangles her
qubit |0〉 as above, which changes whole quantum system to
be (5). As a result, qubit C’ and E are entangled which means
qubit C’ may be |−〉 at channel checking. They can discover
Eve, if the measurement result is |−〉. Furthermore, this way
can not detect Eve, if the C’ is prepared with Z-basis, because
qubit C’ doesn’t entangle with E. It reduces the detection rate
from 100% to 25% with a qubit for channel checking.
1√
2
(|010 + 0〉+ |101 + 0〉)ABCC′E
= 12
( |01000〉+ |01010〉
+ |10100〉+ |10110〉
)
ABCC′E
CNOTB,E⇒ 12
( |01001〉+ |01011〉
+ |10100〉+ |10110〉
)
ABCC′E
CNOTC′,E⇒ 12
( |01001〉+ |01010〉
+ |10100〉+ |10111〉
)
ABCC′E
= 1√
2
(
|010〉 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)
+ |101〉 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
)
ABCC′E
(5)
3) Fake-participant attack: In this kind of attack, Eve
camouflages as one of all participants, and she steals the qubit
sequence from Alice and sends single or Bell entangled qubit
sequence to the participant as Alice. After the participant
resends his encrypted sequence, Eve reads out the key and
encrypts self key of the participant. Then she sends them to the
leader in the round. After the measurement result is published
from leader, all participant can agree final key normally.
For example, three-party case, Alice is a leader in the round,
she sends qubit B and C to Bob and Charlie respectively. When
the qubit B is transmitted, Eve steals them and sends single
or entangled qubit to Bob showed as top of Fig. 7. Fig. 7
takes entangled state as example. After Bob encrypts his self
key at qubit E’, he sends it to Alice. Then Eve steals it again,
and performs Bell measurement on qubit E and E’ to read
out Bob’s self key showed as middle of Fig. 7. Finally, Eve
encrypts Bob’s self key to qubit B and sends it to Alice as
normal participant does showed as bottom of Fig. 7. In this
study, Eve can not have enough power to cover all information
from any participants. So she can not palm off as a participant
completely. Therefore, Eve doesn’t know the position of qubits
for channel checking. She will be detected at step 4.
B. Internal attack
As a result of III, an entangled state can only generate 1
bit key. The key string should be determined by a sequence
of entangled states. In our protocol, the leader has capability
to determine the key because he can publish the result which
he wishes the key. For example, Alice is a leader in two-
party case, she can wait the qubit from Bob. After that, she
performs Bell measurement first, and reads out the self key
of Bob. Then she publish a measurement outcome according
to her idea of final key. For instance, the entangled state of
beginning is |Φ+AB〉, and Bob performs X gate to present his
self key “1” on qubit B. Then he resends qubit B to Alice.
After that, Alice performs Bell measurement and changes the
result to be |Ψ+〉. She publishes |Ψ+〉AB and Φ+AB , if she
want the final key is “1”. That is, this protocol is designed
as leader and followers. All of participants have to be leader
alternately. Leader gets chance to determine the final key at a
bit. However, he can not determine whole key string.
This protocol discuss a internal attack, “collusion”. In the
situation, the subset of participants wants to determine whole
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Fig. 7. Fake participant attack.
key string. Followers can not determine whole key string, even
a bit. Since their self key are always encrypted before the
leader. Moreover, leader can determine a bit, so the situation
is same as that he cooperate with any participants. Therefore
it can be showed that if any one participant wants to
determine whole key string (results of key agreement), he
should cooperate with all participants.
V. CONSUMPTION COMPARISON
This protocol will compare with 5 current MQKAs by
number of “transmission”, “qubit measurement”, “qubit for
channel checking”, and “transmission delay”. This study will
compare with 5 current MQKA protocols which are “Shi and
Zhong [9]”, “Liu et al. [10]”, “Shukla et al. [15]”, “Sun et al.
1 [17]” and “Sun et al. 2 [16]”, where Sun et al. proposed two
MQKA protocols in same year, so the first is called Sun et al.
1 and the second is called Sun et al. 2, respectively. Sun et al.
2 was the improvement of Shen et al. [12] in multi-party case.
Following these 4 indexes, the computation of consumption
will be described as follows:
A. Number of transmission
This subsection discusses number of transmission by 2-
bits key agreement. Each qubit is counted the number of
transmission from all participant without the qubits for channel
checking. The detail of counting is as follows:
1) Shi and Zhong’s MQKA protocol [9]: Shi and Zhong’s
MQKA protocol takes qubit transmission at step 4 as a
transmission round. The protocol should takes N rounds for
transmission, and each round takes N transmissions, where
N is number of participant. As a result, the total transmission
number is N ×N = N2.
2) Liu et al.’s MQKA protocol [10]: Liu et al.’s MQKA
protocol takes qubit transmission at step 3, each participant
sends their qubit sequences to others (N − 1). As a result, the
total transmission number is N × (N − 1).
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Fig. 8. Comparison of number of transmission
3) Shukla et al.’s MQKA protocol [15]: Shukla et al.’s
MQKA protocol takes qubit transmission at step 2 as a round.
They change the operation set in every round. Each participant
should send their qubit sequences to others until the qubit
sequence travelled all participants. However, the protocol can
only agree 1 bit at a key agreement. As a result, the total
transmission number is 2×N ×N .
4) Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 1 [17]: Sun et al.’s MQKA
protocol 1 takes qubit transmission at step 1 as a round. In
every round, all participants send 2 qubit sequences to the
previous and following participants transmission respectively.
The transmission is finished until each two sequence reach
d(N − 1)/2e × 2×N × 4 transmission, where the ceil and 2
is total number of previous and following participant transmis-
sion, the last 4 means that each transmission should transmit
4 sequences.
5) Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 2 [16]: Sun et al.’s MQKA
protocol 2 takes qubit transmission at step 2 as a round. Every
round, all participants send their travelling qubit sequence to
the following participant. After all participants encrypted their
self key, the sequence should be sent to the participant who
prepared the sequence. As a result, the total transmission is
N ×N = N2.
6) Our proposed protocol: Our protocol takes step 1 and
4 as a round, respectively. In these two round, the qubit
sequences was sent to all participants and resent to leader,
respectively. However, each entangled qubits generate 1 bit
key. As a result, the total transmission is (N − 1)× 2× 2.
As a result of Fig. 8, the number of transmission of all
current MQKA protocols is N2, because of unicast transmis-
sion. Therefore, the number of transmissions are higher than
this study. Fig. 8 also shows us that multicast transmission is
more efficient than unicast.
B. Number of qubit measurement
After 2-bits key agreement, the number of qubit measure-
ment should be discussed. Each participant measures these
qubit by specific measurement method such as Bell, GHZ, and
7cluster measurement. After the measurement, they finish the
agreement process. However, the cost is high if the protocol
takes more qubit measurement. This section discusses that
each protocol takes how many measurement during the key
agreement without counting the qubits for channel checking.
Assume that 2-bits key is agreed, and each qubit takes a
measurement count, the count is shown as follows:
1) Shi and Zhong’s MQKA protocol [9]: Shi and Zhong’s
MQKA protocol only takes a Bell measurement for their key
generating at last step of each round. Every participant takes a
Bell measurement at a round and tell the measurement result to
a participant for each round. Every Bell measurement should
be counted 2 in a round. After N rounds, all participants can
get the same key. As a result, the total transmission number is
N×N×2, where the last 2 is that Bell measurement counting.
2) Liu et al.’s MQKA protocol [10]: Liu et al.’s MQKA
protocol takes a single qubit measurement by each participant
at step 5 as a round. In a round, all participants should measure
the qubit sequence sent from N−1 participants. However, each
round, all participant can agree 1 bit key. As a result, the total
transmission number is (N − 1)×N × 2.
3) Shukla et al.’s MQKA protocol [15]: Shukla et al.’s
MQKA protocol takes a Bell measurement by each participant
at step 8. Every participants perform Bell measurement on the
entangled qubits and generate 1 bit key. As a result, the total
transmission number is 2 × N × 2, where the first 2 is Bell
measurement counting and the last 2 is 2 bit key.
4) Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 1 [17]: Sun et al.’s MQKA
protocol 1 takes 3 Bell measurements by each participant at
step 9, and agrees 2 bit key. 3 Bell measurements counts 6
times measurements. And all participants should perform the
measurement. As a result, the total transmission number is
3×N × 2.
5) Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 2 [16]: Sun et al.’s MQKA
protocol 1 takes a cluster measurement by each participant at
step 6, and agrees 2 bit key. A cluster measurement counts
4 times measurements. And all participants should perform
the measurement. As a result, the total transmission number
is 4×N .
6) Our proposed protocol: Our protocol takes a GHZ
measurement by a leader at step 5, and agrees 1 bit key. A
GHZ measurement counts N times measurements. As a result,
the total transmission number is N × 2.
The unicast transmission means that each participant should
transmit and measure the qubits. Therefore, the number of
qubit measurement is often N ∗M , where M is qubit for key
generating. In some protocols, M is constant [15]–[17] but
some is variable such as [9], [10]. This study, M is constant,
and the performance is a little better than other constant
protocols shown in Fig. 9. However, this study can transmit
all entangled qubits in a transmission, and the others should
process these qubits round by round. The detail comparison is
shown in Fig. 10. As a result of comparison of [15]–[17],our
protocol is better than the others. The advantage of constant
M can reduce the transmission delay in our protocol which
discuss at V-D.
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C. Number of qubit for channel checking
The qubit for channel checking should be discussed on
the sequences transmission. These sequences are inserted into
the qubit for channel checking. In this section, all size of
sequences are composed by 100 qubits. There are 10 qubits for
channel checking among a sequence. In fairness, each protocol
agree 180 length of key (some protocols have to transmit
a sequence in a transmission, but some protocols take two
sequences or more), the discussion is as follows:
1) Shi and Zhong’s MQKA protocol [9]: Every participant
of Shi and Zhong’s MQKA protocol takes N transmissions.
And every transmission is inserted into 10 qubits for channel
checking. As a result, the total qubits for channel checking are
N ×N × 10.
2) Liu et al.’s MQKA protocol [10]: Every participant of
Liu et al.’s MQKA protocol takes N − 1 transmissions. And
every transmission are inserted into 10 qubits for channel
checking, where each sequence agrees 100−10 bit key. Under
the requirement of 180 bit key agreement, the protocol should
be implemented twice. As a result, the total qubits for channel
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checking are (N − 1)×N × 10× 2.
3) Shukla et al.’s MQKA protocol [15]: Shukla et al.’s
MQKA protocol is similar to Shi and Zhong [9] but only
1 bit key agreement. As a result, the total qubits for channel
checking are N ×N × 10× 2.
4) Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 1 [17]: Every participant
of Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 1 takes d(N − 1)/2e × 2
transmissions. And each transmission has to transmit 4 se-
quences. Every sequence is inserted into 10 qubits for channel
checking. As a result, the total qubits for channel checking are
d(N − 1)/2e × 2×N × 4× 10.
5) Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 2 [16]: Every participant
of Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 2 takes N transmissions.
And every transmission is inserted into 10 qubits for channel
checking. As a result, the total qubits for channel checking are
N ×N × 10.
6) Our proposed protocol: Our protocol takes N − 1
transmissions. Every transmission are inserted into 10 qubits
for channel checking and agree 1 bit key. Therefore it take 2
times transmissions. As a result, the total qubits for channel
checking are (N − 1)× 2× 2× 10 for 180 bit key agreement.
D. Transmission delay
Every transmission should take a time unit for transmitting
any rounds and sequences, which the time unit can be nanosec-
ond or millisecond, it is decided by quality of channel. If each
round and sequence should be synchronize, the delay is high.
This section discusses time delay of each round and sequence
transmission for agreeing 2 bit key, the discussion is shown
as follows:
1) Shi and Zhong’s MQKA protocol [9]: Shi and Zhong’s
MQKA protocol should take N rounds for helping each
participant to agree 2 bit key. After synchronization of each
round, all participants can continue to the next 2 bit key.
Every round should take a time unit. As a result, the total
transmission delay is N time unit.
2) Liu et al.’s MQKA protocol [10]: Liu et al.’s MQKA
protocol can transmit all qubit sequences in one round, and
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
on
 d
el
ay
 (
ti
m
e 
u
n
it
)
Number of participant
Shi Liu
Shukla Sun 1
Sun 2 Ours
Fig. 12. Comparison of transmission delay
each qubit can agree 1 bit key. Under the requirement of 2 bit
key, the protocol should take 2 rounds. As a result, the total
transmission delay is 2 time unit.
3) Shukla et al.’s MQKA protocol [15]: The calculation of
transmission delay of Shukla et al.’s MQKA protocol is similar
to Shi and Zhong [9]. However, they only agree 1 bit key. As
a result, the total transmission delay is N × 2 time unit.
4) Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 1 [17]: Every participant of
Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 1 should take d(N − 1)/2e × 2
for the previous and following participants as rounds. All par-
ticipant have to synchronize every transmission in one round.
As a result, the total transmission delay is d(N − 1)/2e × 2
time unit.
5) Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 2 [16]: Every participant of
Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 2 has to send their qubit sequence
to following participant at a round. 2 bits key is agreed when
the last following participant sent the sequence back to the
participant who prepared the sequence. As a result, the total
transmission delay is N time unit.
6) Our proposed protocol: The calculation of transmission
delay at Our protocol is very simple. It only takes 2 round
for 1 bit key agreement. Under the requirement of 2 bit key
agreement, the total transmission delay is 2× 2 time unit.
Each round should take a time unit. So, even the protocols
[15]–[17] are great at “number of qubit measurement”. The
property of round by round takes more time unit than our
protocol. One of them [10] of “number of qubit measurement”
is less than ours, because each participant can send their self
key to others in one round for 1 bit key agreement. But our
protocol should takes two. However, our protocol is more
efficient than Liu et al. [10] at other indexes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study not only defines the difference of condition
1 of nowadays QKA protocols, but also proposes a multi-
party QKA protocol with multicast method. The consumption
comparison section shows the performance that is better than
the other protocols such as [9], [10], [15]–[17] with unicast
9method in 4 comparison indexes which are number of “trans-
mission”, “qubit measurement”, “qubit for channel checking”,
and “transmission delay”. In addition, the security analysis
section shows that this protocol can detect and against the
eavesdropper at external and internal attack. As a result, this
protocol is the best MQKA protocol, it can not only reduce
number of transmission and qubit for channel checking, but
also exchange all self keys simultaneously.
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